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POLICE MISCONDUCT AS A BREACH OF 
PUBLIC TRUST: THE OFFENCE OF 
MISCONDUCT IN PUBLIC OFFICE  
CINDY DAVIDS∗ 
MARILYN MCMAHON∗∗ 
Until relatively recently, the common law offence of misconduct in public 
office has been regarded as anachronistic. The offence was perceived to 
have been supplanted by specific statutory offences that could more 
appropriately deal with criminal conduct by public officials. However, there 
has been a revival of the offence with successful prosecutions occurring in 
Australia, England and Hong Kong. Many of these contemporary cases 
have involved police officers. Examination of these cases reveals that the 
circumstances in which misconduct in public office has been identified have 
been diverse, including the unauthorised disclosure of confidential 
information, the use of false search warrants and the sexual exploitation of 
vulnerable persons. In many instances, police officers were charged with 
other criminal offences in addition to charges relating to misconduct in 
public office. The matters prosecuted as misconduct in public office 
typically involved matters that were serious and/or could not be adequately 
prosecuted as other criminal offences or as breaches of police regulations 
governing conduct. Consequently, despite the proliferation of statutory 
criminal offences in the 20th century it appears that there continues to be a 
place for the offence of misconduct in public office. It criminalises 
misconduct by police officers that may not be adequately dealt with by other 
offences and recognises the public trust dimension of wrongdoing by these 
officials. However, a continuing and fundamental challenge is to determine 
the appropriate definition and scope of the offence. 
I INTRODUCTION  
Public knowledge of improper conduct by parliamentarians, local elected 
officials, and public officials at various levels (public or civil servants), can 
lead to a reduced level of confidence and trust in democratic institutions and, 
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in extreme cases, to an erosion of their claims to legitimacy.1 It may also lead 
to a broader culture of cynicism, with other occupational groups able to point 
to examples of double standards set by those occupying the highest public 
offices. Such improper conduct itself represents an abuse of the public office 
that is held by the person concerned — it violates both the public trust that 
attaches to the holding of public office and the integrity that is expected of 
those occupying such positions. 
The problem of misconduct in public office has at its heart the issue of trust 
and the notion that public officials who hold and exercise power and authority 
must be accountable to the public. The offence of misconduct in public office 
involves, broadly speaking, a wilful neglect of duty, or wilful misconduct, by 
a public officer that amounts to an abuse of the public trust.2 Establishing the 
distinct offence of misconduct in public office has its roots in a desire to 
penalise behaviours — acts and omissions — which fall egregiously short of 
acceptable standards of behaviour from public office holders; and where 
standard organisational disciplinary responses are regarded as, in themselves, 
inadequate in relation to the gravity of the misconduct.  
In the domain of policing, the process of holding individual police officers to 
account for misconduct is set against a complex background of formal 
disciplinary and regulatory frameworks, various laws, rules and regulations, 
and myriad practices of informal social control that exist within the cultural 
milieu of police organisations. The standard method of operationalising 
individual police officer accountability is through a formal police discipline 
system, which may be invoked when a member of the public or other affected 
person makes a formal complaint about perceived problematic behaviour. 
Police discipline systems follow internal (organisational) procedures, although 
there may also be external police complaints bodies and/or independent 
agency oversight.3 On occasion, particularly in relation to matters involving 
serious misconduct, a less frequent path of criminal charges against a police 
officer may be pursued. 
This article examines the way in which the public trust invested in public 
officials is now being extended to police officers and protected through the 
offence of misconduct in public office. It traces the re-emergence in the late 
                                                 
1 For example, Transparency International (TI) Australian Director, Michael Ahrens, explained 
that a four-point drop in Australia’s score in the TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 could 
be partly due to corruption findings against New South Wales (NSW) politicians and 
generally perceived corruption in the (then) NSW government (see Transparency 
International Australia, Update No 177, December 2013).  
2 Attorney General’s Reference No 3 of 2003 [2004] EWCA Crim 868 (‘AG Reference No 3’). 
3 Cindy Davids, Conflict of Interest in Policing: Problems, Practices, and Principles (Sydney, 
Institute of Criminology Press, 2008). 
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20th century of a longstanding common law offence that had fallen into disuse. 
The contemporary application of the offence of misconduct in public office to 
criminal behaviour by police has involved considerable development and 
elaboration of an offence that has its roots in early notions of public trust 
invested in public officials. The elements involved in pursuing this common 
law offence are examined by reference to recent cases in Victoria, Australia. 
Cases from the United Kingdom and a third common-law jurisdiction that has 
seen successful prosecution and conviction of police officers utilising the 
offence of misconduct in public office — Hong Kong — are also drawn upon 
to explore the nature of this offence.  
The article analyses the elements of the offence, focusing on: 
• the scope of the term ‘public official’;  
• the distinctions between police officer behaviour on and off 
duty and between actions in the course of or in relation to 
official duties or functions;  
• the requirement of wilful and intentional misconduct; 
• the required seriousness of the misconduct; and  
• the importance of the concept of the ‘public interest’.  
Concerns, particularly from the United Kingdom, around issues of double 
jeopardy are also considered. Finally, utilising case detail from recent 
prosecutions, the article seeks to provide a nuanced understanding of the 
circumstances giving rise to prosecution of police officers for misconduct in 
public office, considering the particular public interest that the offence seeks 
to protect.  
II THE OFFENCE OF MISCONDUCT IN PUBLIC OFFICE 
A Historical Background 
The offence of misconduct in public office can be traced back to the 18th 
century. In 1704, in Anonymous, the court held: 
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If a man be made an officer by Act of Parliament, and misbehave himself in 
his office, he is indictable for it at common law, and any publick officer is 
indictable for misbehaviour in his office.4 
By the late 18th century, the offence was further consolidated, and the range of 
persons regarded as ‘public officers’ was extended to those holding an ‘office 
of trust’. In R v Bembridge, Lord Mansfield stated: 
Here there are two principles applicable: first, that a man accepting an 
office of trust concerning the public, especially if attended with profit, is 
answerable criminally to the King for misbehaviour in his office; this is 
true, by whomever and in whatever way the officer is appointed ... 
Secondly, where there is a breach of trust, fraud, or imposition, in a matter 
concerning the public, though as between individuals it would only be 
actionable, yet as between the King and the subject it is indictable. That 
such should be the rule is essential to the existence of the country.5 
By the late 19th century, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen defined ‘public officer’ 
broadly as ‘a person invested with authority to execute any public duty, and 
legally bound to do so’.6 In 1914, the court in R v Whitaker more expansively 
noted: 
A public office holder is an officer who discharges any duty in the 
discharge of which the public are interested, more clearly so if he is paid out 
of a fund provided by the public.7 
The ambit of ‘public officer’ was subsequently extended to cover a wide 
variety of public officials, including persons who act in an unpaid, voluntary 
capacity.8  
The scope of the offence was also extended. Early cases tended to prosecute 
misconduct involving fraud and bribery. However, the definition of 
‘misconduct’ eventually expanded beyond fraud and deceits in office to 
encompass a ‘great variety of circumstances’.9  
                                                 
4 (1704) 6 Mod 96; 87 ER 853. 
5 (1783) 3 Dougl 327; 99 ER 679. 
6 The definition excluded ‘any member of either House of Parliament as such, or any 
ecclesiastical, naval, or military officer acting in the discharge of duties for the due discharge 
of which he can be made accountable only by an ecclesiastical, naval, or military court’: 
James Fitzjames Stephen, A Digest of the Criminal Law (Crimes and Punishments), 
(Macmillan, 4th ed, 1887) 83 <https://archive.org/details/adigestcriminal02stepgoog>.  
7 [1914] 3 KB 1283. 
8 R v Belton [2010] WLR (D) 283. 
9 AG Reference No 3 [2004] EWCA 868 [54] (Roderick Evans J). 
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In a seminal work on official misconduct, Finn cited various examples of 
conduct falling within the scope of the common law offence, illustrating its 
broad nature: 
(a) frauds and deceits by officers (fraud in office) as where a consular 
official misappropriates moneys which he is duty bound to remit to 
a Government department; 
(b) wilful neglect of duty (nonfeasance) as where a police officer 
wilfully refuses to enforce the law; 
(c) ‘malicious’ exercise of official power (misfeasance) as where 
licensing authorities grant or refuse an application for reasons 
known to be improper; 
(d) wilful excesses of official authority (malfeasance), as where a 
magistrate assumes to act in a matter known to be beyond the 
competence of his office; and 
(e) the intentional infliction of bodily harm, imprisonment, or other 
injury upon a person (oppression) as where a justice, without 
authority, orders a person to be whipped.10  
Despite the expansion in the definition of ‘public office’ and the broadening 
of the circumstances that could constitute misconduct, by the middle of the 
20th century the offence was rarely prosecuted. A complicating factor was 
that, in those infrequent matters where such a charge was laid, it was 
generally conceded that there was some uncertainty in the definition of the 
offence. Thus, Widgery J observed in R v Llewellyn Jones11 that it was not 
easy to lay down with precision the parameters of misconduct or 
misbehaviour that was covered by the offence. The South Australian Court of 
Criminal Appeal expressed similar concerns in Question of Law Reserved (No 
2 of 1996),12 which dealt with three police officers accessing and disclosing 
confidential information to a third party. 
B Responding to Uncertainty 
Two responses emerged to the uncertainty inherent in the offence of 
misconduct in public office: to prefer other, specific criminal charges rather 
                                                 
10 Paul Finn, ‘Official Misconduct’ (1978) 2(6) Criminal Law Journal 307, 310–11. 
11 (1967) 51 Cr App R 4, 6. 
12 (1996) 67 SASR 63. 
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than prosecute for the common law offence; or to overhaul the offence by 
adopting a statutory formulation.13  
Many legal commentators have criticised the common law offence as too 
broad and uncertain; charging with alternative, specific statutory offences has 
been preferred.14 For instance, prosecution authorities in England adopt a 
restrictive approach to bringing charges of misconduct in public office. Policy 
guidelines issued by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) state that where 
there is clear evidence of one or more statutory offences, those offences 
should be prosecuted in preference to misconduct in public office.15 When 
such alternative prosecutions occur, the element of ‘public office’ is to be 
regarded as constituting an aggravating factor to be taken into account in 
sentencing. Similarly, a United Kingdom Parliamentary Note specifically 
advises that while a criminal act by a public officer might result in a charge of 
misconduct in public office, the matter could be pursued via a criminal charge 
and the ‘public’ aspect taken into account as an aggravating factor at 
sentencing.16 However, for some critics even these restrictions are 
insufficient. Thus, Parsons believes that the scope of the offence of 
misconduct in public office is too broad, given the seriousness of the charge, 
the fact that it is triable only on indictment, and that it carries a maximum 
punishment of life imprisonment in the United Kingdom. He advocates a high 
bar for prosecution, suggesting that this offence be reserved for serious 
instances of misconduct when there is no alternative statutory offence that 
would adequately capture the nature of the misconduct or invest the court with 
adequate sentencing powers.17 
Another response to the uncertainty has been to introduce a statutory version 
of the offence. For example, Queensland has introduced a statutory 
misconduct in public office offence. The section is modelled on the common 
law offence but is designed to fit more appropriately into the Criminal Code 
of that State.18 A statutory version of the offence has been proposed in 
                                                 
13 See, eg, Lucinda Maer, Misconduct in Public Office (Parliamentary Note SN/PC/04909, 
House of Commons Library, Parliament of the United Kingdom, 2009). 
14 See, eg, Simon Parsons, ‘Misconduct in Public Office — Should It Still Be Prosecuted?’ 
(2012) 76(2) Journal of Criminal Law 179. 
15 CPS, Misconduct in Public Office (Legal Guidance) (undated) <http://www.cps. 
gov.uk/legal/l_to_o/misconduct_in_public_office/>. 
16 Maer, above n 13. 
17 Parsons, above n 14, 185. 
18 Section 92A of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) makes it an offence for a public officer to deal 
with information gained because of office, to perform or fail to perform a function of office, 
or to do an act in abuse of the authority of office, with intent to dishonestly gain a benefit for 
the officer or another person or to dishonestly cause detriment to another person. The offence 
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England.19 However, most jurisdictions have resisted the call for codification, 
and misconduct in public office continues to be a common law offence.  
C Prosecutions 
While the controversy concerning the appropriate way to prosecute behaviour 
constituting misconduct in public office continues, in the last quarter of the 
20th century there was an apparent increase in the number of prosecutions of 
the common law offence. The revival of the offence has been traced20 to two 
key cases in England: R v Llewellyn-Jones and R v Dytham.21 The former 
involved a county court registrar using his office to gain an improper financial 
advantage; the latter involved a police officer who ignored a violent 
confrontation that resulted in the death of a victim of the attack. Subsequently, 
the offence has been prosecuted in a wide variety of circumstances. In 
defining the scope of public office, the nature of the office has not been 
important; the key matter has been that the office had to be ‘for the public 
good’.22  
In response to a question in the British Parliament, then Secretary of State for 
Justice Jack Straw revealed that in England between 1998 and 2007, 56 
defendants had been proceeded against in situations where misconduct in 
public office constituted the principal offence.23 In 2007 alone, there were 
proceedings against 21 defendants.24 No equivalent data is available for 
Australia.  
There is an increasing trend for misconduct in public office offences to 
involve the unauthorised use of information.25 In the United Kingdom, it has 
been noted that utilising the misconduct in public office offence provides an 
                                                                                                                    
carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment of seven years. The offence came into effect 
from 24 September 2009. 
19 In 1997 the Law Commission of England and Wales recommended the creation of a statutory 
offence of misconduct in public office. The proposal recently has been revived and is the 
subject of an investigation by the Commission. A final report on the matter will be published 
in 2016: Law Commission of England and Wales, Eleventh Programme of Reform (July 
2011) 18 <www.lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc330_eleventh_programme.pdf>. 
20 Parsons, above n 14, 180. 
21 [1979] QB 722. 
22 R v Lancaster and Worrall (1890) 16 Cox CC 737, 739 (Wiles J). 
23 Maer, above n 13, 11. 
24 Ibid.  
25 Ibid 29. 
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attractive option for prosecutors when dealing with police officers who pass 
on confidential details from police computers.26  
D Elements of the Offence 
Although still relatively rarely prosecuted, an apparent revival of prosecutions 
for misconduct in public office has prompted re-examination of the elements 
and application of the offence. Four recent cases — two from Hong Kong and 
one each from the United Kingdom and Australia — illustrate significant 
judicial examination and articulation of the key elements of the offence. 
In a landmark case from Hong Kong — Shum Kwok Sher v HKSAR (‘Shum 
Kwok Sher’) — Mason NPJ reviewed previous authority and outlined the 
elements of the offence as follows: 
(1) A public official; 
(2) who in the course of or in relation to his public office; 
(3) wilfully and intentionally; 
(4) culpably misconducts himself.27 
Significantly, the Court extended the ambit of misconduct to acts or omissions 
‘in relation to, or under colour of exercising, the office’.28 
The subsequent English case AG Reference No 329 involved police officers 
and caused further examination of the elements of the offence. The officers 
were charged with gross negligence, manslaughter, and misconduct in public 
office relating to a victim who presented at a hospital after a fight and became 
aggressive and confrontational towards hospital staff. The victim was 
subsequently detained by police and died in the police station after he had 
been handcuffed and placed in a semi-face-down position, arguably suffering 
severe breathing difficulties. The misconduct in public office charge alleged 
that each police officer ‘misconducted himself whilst serving as a police 
                                                 
26 Martin Wasik, ‘Computer Misuse and Misconduct in Public Office’ (2008) 22(1-2) 
International Review of Law Computers and Technology 135, 138. 
27 [2002] 5 HKCFAR 381 [84] (Mason NPJ, Li CJ, Bokhary PJ, Chan PJ, Ribeiro PJ). The facts 
of the case related to the improper awarding of a government contract by a public servant 
property manager to members of his extended family. The court considered whether the 
common law offence of misconduct in public office was so general as to be unconstitutional 
under the Hong Kong Basic Law (Constitution). 
28 Ibid [81]. 
29 [2004] EWCA 868. 
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officer, by wilfully failing to take reasonable and proper care of … an arrested 
person in police custody’.30 At the judge’s direction, the police officers were 
acquitted of both the manslaughter and misconduct in public office charges, 
on the basis in relation to the latter that there was insufficient evidence of the 
element of recklessness. Following the original acquittal, the Attorney-
General of England sought specific guidance from the Court of Appeal on the 
key issue: What are the ingredients of the common law offence of misconduct 
in a public office?  
In particular, the reference addressed the issue of whether it is necessary in 
proceedings for an offence of misconduct in a public office for the 
prosecution to prove ‘bad faith’ and, if so, what does bad faith mean in this 
context?31 The Court’s answers to these questions provided a statement of the 
key elements of the common law offence in the United Kingdom: 
The elements of the offence of misconduct in a public office are:  
(1) A public officer acting as such … 
(2) Wilfully neglects to perform his duty and/or wilfully misconducts 
himself …  
(3) To such a degree as to amount to an abuse of the public’s trust in the 
office holder … 
(4) Without reasonable excuse or justification …32  
The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal next considered the matter in Sin Kam 
Wah and Lam Chuen Ip v HKSAR (‘Sin and Lam’)33 in 2005, and drew on the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal in AG Reference No 3 to develop the 
elements of the offence previously considered in the Shum Kwok Sher 
decision.  
Sin and Lam involved an off duty policeman who was found to have accepted 
gratuities from a nightclub owner whom he was duty bound to arrest. The 
court reformulated the misconduct in public office offence into five elements 
articulated in the following way: 
                                                 
30 Ibid [1]. 
31 Ibid [2]. 
32 Ibid [61]. 
33 [2005] HKCFAR 29. It should be noted that in his references to this case in R v Quach (2010) 
27 VR 310, Redlich JA referred to the defendants Sin Kam Wah and Lam Chuen Ip as ‘Wah’ 
and ‘Ip’ respectively. Here, the authors use the family names of the defendants: ‘Sin’ and 
‘Lam’. 
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The offence is committed where: 
(1) a public official; 
(2) in the course of or in relation to his public office; 
(3) wilfully misconducts himself; by act or omission, for example, by 
wilfully neglecting or failing to perform his duty; 
(4) without reasonable excuse or justification; and  
(5) where such misconduct was serious, not trivial, having regard to the 
responsibilities of the office and the officeholder, the importance of the public 
objects which they serve and the nature and extent of the departure from those 
responsibilities.34  
The issue was subsequently considered by the Court of Appeal of Victoria in 
R v Quach.35 In this case the Court considered a referral from a trial judge 
following pre-trial argument concerning a charge of misconduct in public 
office involving a police officer who had allegedly used his position to take 
advantage sexually of a vulnerable woman. The reference sought guidance on 
the elements of the offence. The Court reviewed the line of authority 
identified above and broadly endorsed the formulation of misconduct in 
public office by Mason NPJ in Sin and Lam. Redlich JA outlined the elements 
of the offence as follows: 
[T]he elements of the offence are: 
(1) a public official; 
(2) in the course of or connected to his public office; 
(3) wilfully misconduct [sic] himself; by act or omission, for example, 
by wilfully neglecting or failing to perform his duty; 
(4) without reasonable excuse or justification; and 
(5) where such misconduct is serious and meriting criminal 
punishment having regard to the responsibilities of the office and 
the officeholder, the importance of the public objects which they 
                                                 
34 Sin and Lam [2005] HKCFAR 29 [45] (Mason NPJ). See also Prosecutions Division of the 
Department of Justice (Hong Kong) Criminal Appeals Bulletin, June 2005, 11–12. 
35 (2010) 27 VR 310. 
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serve and the nature and extent of the departure from those 
objects.36 
Thus, recent Victorian authority endorses the elements of the offence 
identified by Mason NPJ in Sin and Lam with only minor modification in 
relation to the nexus between the misconduct and the office, with Quach 
simply requiring a ‘connection’.  
In the remainder of this article, the elements of the offence will be explored in 
relation to their application to misconduct in public office by police officers. 
As the discussion will show, some elements have been particularly 
troublesome in relation to the prosecution of police officers for this offence.  
1 Public Official 
It is clear that police officers are regarded as public officials (element 1).37 A 
recent judgment from the United Kingdom has also made clear that the scope 
of ‘public officials’ includes police officers serving a period of suspension as 
well as former police officers engaged in re-employment in a part-time 
capacity.38 Others who work for the police, including community support 
officers and those in charge of computer systems, including civilian call 
handlers, are also regarded as public officers.  
Whilst it has been settled law that prison officers are public officials for the 
purpose of misconduct in public office, in Cosford, Falloon and Flynn v The 
Queen (‘Cosford’), the English Court of Appeal found that three nurses who 
worked for the United Kingdom prison service (but who were not prison 
guards) were public officials.39 Interestingly, the Court held that whether the 
nurses were employees of a public authority or private entity was not 
significant in determining liability for the offence: 
Whether the prison is run directly by the state or indirectly through a private 
company paid by the state to perform this function does not alter the public 
                                                 
36 Ibid [46]. 
37 R v Dytham (1979) 69 Cr App R 387; DPP v Marks [2005] VSCA 277; R v Quach (2010) 27 
VR 310.  
38 Cosford, Falloon and Flynn v The Queen [2013] EWCA Civ 466 [35]. The Court of Appeal 
summarised an array of employment situations in which people have been judicially regarded 
as public officials for the purposes of misconduct in public office. 
39 [2013] EWCA Civ 466. In the context of contemporary government business models, this 
raises a number of interesting issues for an increasingly privatised policing function and the 
potential for misconduct in public office to be extended to the realm of private policing. 
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nature of the duties of those undertaking the work: the responsibilities to the 
public are identical.40 
A recent Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal case has reiterated that the 
definition of public official applies to those who exercise ‘powers, discretions 
or duties exercisable by virtue of his official position, conferred on him for the 
public benefit’.41 The Court noted that a person who occupies a position that 
confers no such powers on him ‘is not a candidate for prosecution for the 
offence [of misconduct in public office] even if he is employed by a 
government department or by an analogous public body’.42  
Millett NPJ summarised this position as follows: 
The offence can be committed only by a public official. It cannot be 
committed by an ordinary member of the general public. But it does not 
discriminate against government employees. The reason it does not do so is 
that the core concept is abuse of official power. It can therefore be 
committed only by persons who are invested with powers, duties, 
responsibilities or discretions which they are obliged to exercise or 
discharge for the benefit of the general public. Such persons may or may not 
be employed by the government; they may or may not be paid. They may be 
high officers of state or lowly employees; the offence may be committed as 
well by a police or customs officer as by a government minister. The 
common element is that the accused must have abused some power, duty or 
responsibility entrusted to or invested in him or her and exercisable in the 
public interest.43 
Thus, while not every public employee is susceptible to liability,44 police 
officers and a range of others exercising policing and related powers and 
responsibilities in the public interest clearly fall within the ambit of the 
offence of misconduct in public office. 
2 In the Course of or Connected to Public Office 
The second essential element in misconduct in public office is that the 
misconduct has a sufficient nexus to the public office. In AG Reference No 3, 
the Court of Appeal held that the misconduct must occur when the public 
official was acting as such. However, Mason NPJ appeared to adopt a broader 
interpretation of the relationship in the later case of Sin and Lam, holding that 
                                                 
40 Cosford [2013] EWCA Civ 466 [37].  
41 HKSAR v Wong Lin-Kay [2012] HKCFA 33 [19] (Ribeiro PJ) (emphasis added). 
42 Ibid [22]. 
43 Ibid [44]. 
44 Ibid [34]. 
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this element will be satisfied where the misconduct occurs ‘in the course of or 
in relation to [the] public office’.45 In determining whether the necessary 
nexus was established, Mason NPJ went on to say: 
To constitute the offence of misconduct in public office, wilful misconduct 
which has a relevant relationship with the defendant’s public office is 
enough. Thus, misconduct otherwise than in the performance of the 
defendant’s public duties may nevertheless have such a relationship with his 
public office as to bring that office into disrepute, in circumstances where 
the misconduct is both culpable and serious and not trivial.46  
Sin and Lam suggests that a charge of misconduct in public office against a 
police officer may be sustained even if the officer was not actually on duty at 
the relevant time. Redlich JA in Quach reaffirmed this interpretation of this 
element in Victoria, quoting the High Court of Australia in Bunning v The 
Queen: ‘The offences having been committed by a public officer and in the 
purported course of his duties (or sufficiently connected with those duties)’.47 
In fact, Australian jurisprudence now suggests that interpreting AG Reference 
No 3 as requiring a stricter relationship than was required in Shum Kwok Sher 
is based on a misunderstanding. Redlich JA noted in Quach that, in AG 
Reference No 3: 
The Court of Appeal referred with apparent approval to Shum Kwok Sher, at 
least in respect of that particular element, and expressly adverted to the fact 
that the element was not in issue before them. It did not appear to recognise 
any difference between its conception of the element and that articulated in 
Shum Kwok Sher. Significantly, the later decision of Wah & IP [sic] which 
restated the elements in Shum Kwok Sher, referred with apparent approval 
to the decision of the Court of Appeal in AG No 3, which suggests that 
neither Court perceived any inconsistency between their differing 
descriptions of the element.48 
                                                 
45 [2005] HKCFAR 29 [45] (emphasis added). 
46 Ibid [47]. 
47 [2008] HCASL 267 [6] (Kirby and Heydon JJ, quoted in R v Quach (2010) 27 VR 310 [35] 
(emphasis added by Redlich JA). In Bunning v The Queen, the High Court refused to grant 
Bunning special leave to appeal against sentence on 10 counts of misconduct in public office. 
In the original Victorian County Court trial, Bunning had pleaded guilty to the misconduct in 
public office charges. He appealed the sentence to the Court of Appeal. In the appeal, the 
prosecution conceded ‘an error which vitiates the exercise of the sentencing discretion’ (R v 
Bunning [2007] VSCA 205 [3] (Kellam JA)). The appeal was allowed and the Court of 
Appeal re-sentenced the defendant. Bunning subsequently sought leave to appeal to the High 
Court but leave was not granted, and as part of their judgment, Kirby and Heydon JJ made the 
comments later taken up by Redlich JA, as reported here. 
48 R v Quach (2010) 27 VR 310 [36].  
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The upshot of this is that a successful prosecution may be conducted against a 
public official even when the relevant misconduct occurred when they were 
operating in an apparently private capacity — provided that there is a 
sufficient connection between their conduct and their public office. As 
Redlich JA made clear: 
Certain responsibilities of the office will attach to the officer whether or not 
the officer is acting in the course of that office. Where the misconduct does 
not occur during the performance of a function or duty of the office, the 
offence may be made out where the misconduct is inconsistent with those 
responsibilities. It may be connected to a duty already performed or to one 
yet to be performed or it may relate to the responsibilities of the office in 
some other way. The misconduct must be incompatible with the proper 
discharge of the responsibilities of the office so as to amount to a breach of 
the confidence which the public has placed in the office, thus giving it its 
public and criminal character.49 
Thus, in Quach, there is confirmation that the second element of the offence is 
essentially as outlined in Sin and Lam, with a refined statement of the nexus 
between the conduct and the office held by the public official as relating to 
acts or omissions ‘in the course of or connected to [the] public office’. The 
Hong Kong and Australian judgments suggest that this is regarded as 
consistent with — and indeed, a clarification of — the approach in AG 
Reference No 3. 
3 Wilful Misconduct by Act or Omission  
The third element of misconduct in public office raises two issues: (1) 
wilfulness and intention on the part of the public official; and (2) 
responsibility for acts and omissions — for misfeasance/malfeasance and 
nonfeasance. In relation to the latter, it has been established that nonfeasance 
(failure to act) as well as misfeasance (wilful or intentional inappropriate or 
incorrect action) and malfeasance (wilful or intentional action that causes 
injury), can found a prosecution (element three). Nonfeasance was the basis of 
misconduct in the English case of R v Dytham. In this case, a police officer — 
on duty and in uniform — failed to intervene in a violent assault to which he 
was a witness (and the victim died as a result of the assault). The officer was 
charged with, and found guilty of, misconduct in public office. The trial judge 
commented: 
the accused misconducted himself whilst acting as an officer of justice in 
that he, being present and witness to a criminal offence, apparently a violent 
assault … deliberately failed to carry out his duty as a police constable by 
                                                 
49 Ibid [40] (Ashley JA and Hansen AJA). 
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wilfully omitting to take any steps to preserve the Queen’s Peace or to 
protect the person … or to arrest or otherwise bring to justice [the] 
assailants.50 
Misconduct in public office was established in this case on the basis of a 
deliberate and knowing failure to act, construed as a wilful neglect of duty. 
R v Dytham also provides some insight into the issue of wilfulness. The 
defence had argued that misconduct in public office required evidence of 
‘some improper or corrupt or dishonest motive’ and that nonfeasance by the 
holder of a public office was insufficient to establish liability for the offence; 
there must, it was argued, be malfeasance or at least misfeasance involving an 
element of corruption.51 
However, both the trial judge and the appeal court found that the offence 
could be found ‘in circumstances where there is no element of corruption or 
dishonesty’.52 The appellate court found that, although prior judgments 
showed that many misconduct in public office cases did involve a dishonest 
motive: 
[S]ome corrupt taint … [is] not a necessary incident of the offence. 
Misconduct in a public office is more vividly exhibited where dishonesty is 
revealed as part of the dereliction of duty. Indeed in some cases the conduct 
impugned cannot be shown to have been misconduct unless it was done 
with a corrupt or oblique motive.53 
The court identified that the key test was whether ‘the misconduct impugned 
is calculated to injure the public interest so as to call for condemnation and 
punishment’.54  
A more recent test of these elements arose in the United Kingdom in the 2010 
appellate decision in R v W55 where a metropolitan police officer misused a 
police-provided credit card for personal expenditures. The parameters of the 
card provided to the officer covered legitimate travel and subsistence in 
relation to official duties. He failed to submit expense summaries and 
appropriate forms and admitted to using the card contrary to Force 
                                                 
50 R v Dytham (1979) 69 Cr App R 387, 389 (Neill J). 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid 391 (Neill J). 
53 Ibid 393 (Shaw LJ, Widgery LCJ and McNeill J) (emphasis added). 
54 Ibid 394. The judge added: ‘Whether such a situation is revealed by the evidence is a matter 
that a jury has to decide. It puts no heavier burden upon them than when in more familiar 
contexts.’ 
55 [2010] EWCA Crim 372. 
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instructions. However, the defence argued that: he intended to repay the 
private expenditure amounts; the practice of using and then repaying the 
Force was common practice amongst his colleagues; and, whilst he had 
wilfully misused the card, he was not guilty of deliberate dishonesty or 
misconduct.  
The police officer had been convicted at the Crown Court at Southwark in 
2009. The trial judge had provided directions to the jury with regard to the 
proof that was required to establish the offence of misconduct in public office: 
The jury was directed that the prosecution had to prove that the appellant 
‘wilfully — that means to say, deliberately — misconducted himself to such 
a degree as to amount to an abuse of the public’s trust in that office holder, 
without reasonable excuse or justification. ... the prosecution must prove 
misconduct of a high degree. We are not talking here about a mere bending 
of the rules or cutting corners ... to amount to abuse of public trust a 
mistake, even a serious one, will not suffice either. The prosecution must 
prove that the office holder has fallen way below, or far below, the 
standards expected of him as, in this case, a police officer’.56 
This direction was the subject of a successful appeal to the Court of Appeal: 
the appellant argued that the original trial judge had erred in law. Cronin 
argues that this direction as far as it went was consistent with AG Reference 
No 3 but that the trial judge favoured the Crown’s submission that no 
particular subjective mental element was required.57 This seemed to overlook 
the statement in AG Reference No 3 that: 
There must be an awareness of the duty to act or a subjective recklessness 
as to the existence of the duty. The recklessness test will apply to the 
question whether, in particular circumstances, a duty arises at all as well as 
to the conduct of the defendant if it does. The subjective test applies both to 
reckless indifference to the legality of the act or omission and in relation to 
the consequences of the act or omission.58  
In relation to dishonesty, the Court of Appeal found that: 
when the crime of misconduct in a public office is committed in 
circumstances which involve the acquisition of property by theft or fraud, 
and in particular when the holder of a public office is alleged to have made 
improper claims for public funds in circumstances which are said to be 
                                                 
56 Ibid [7] (Penry-Davey LCJ and Irwin J). 
57 Alison Cronin, ‘Misconduct in Public Office: Dishonesty Is an Element if Misconduct 
Amounts to Theft or Fraud’ (2010) 74(4) Journal of Criminal Law 290, 290. 
58 [2004] EWCA 868 [30]. 
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criminal, an essential ingredient of the offence is proof that the defendant 
was dishonest.59 
Cronin criticised the reasoning of the Court of Appeal on this issue, arguing 
that it was based on a selective reading of the older cases, in particular R v 
Dytham.60 Cronin argues that the Court relied on an observation made in 
Dytham that the offence of misconduct ‘is not restricted to dishonesty’,61 
extrapolating a ‘clear implication that dishonesty would be a necessary 
ingredient of some manifestations of the offence’.62 According to Cronin: 
It would seem this innocuous, uncontroversial comment in Dytham 
acknowledging the broad nature of the offence, is now taken by the Court of 
Appeal as authority for the proposition that dishonesty will be a necessary 
element of the offence in some circumstances.63 
The problem as Cronin sees it is that this now blurs the historical distinction 
between two separate lines of cases relating to nonfeasance and misfeasance. 
She sees this as crucial to an understanding of the offence, at least in the 
United Kingdom. Relying on the early case of R v Bembridge, she identifies 
the need for proof that the concealments were made corruptly and 
fraudulently and argues that this mens rea requirement was followed in 
subsequent cases of positive misfeasance.  
In other cases which emerged around the same time, an alternative branch of 
misconduct in public office was developed that recognised its existence in the 
neglect of official duties or ‘nonfeasance’. Unlike misconduct by misfeasance, 
misconduct by nonfeasance did not require mens rea. The importance of this 
difference between the two branches of the offence is that the failure to 
clearly separate the two resulted in some confusion as to when the subjective 
mental element of corruption, dishonesty or oppression must be proven. 
Cronin argues that AG Reference No 3 unified the offence, incorporating both 
misfeasance and nonfeasance and imposing a subjective mental element to 
both types of behaviour. So, based on AG Reference No 3, misconduct in 
public office involves wrongdoing that amounts to an abuse of public trust 
and ‘wilful misconduct’ means ‘deliberately doing something which is wrong 
                                                 
59 R v W [2010] EWCA Crim 372 [14]. 
60 Cronin, above n 57, 291. 
61 R v Dytham (1979) 69 Cr App R 387, 394. 
62 R v W [2010] EWCA Crim 372 [10]. 
63 Cronin, above n 57, 292. 
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knowing it to be wrong or with reckless indifference as to whether is it wrong 
or not’.64  
The point here is that the relevant mental state may or may not be 
accompanied by dishonesty. If present, dishonesty may aggravate the offence, 
but, according to Cronin’s analysis of AG Reference No 3, it is no longer a 
necessary ingredient in misconduct. Misconduct and dishonesty are separate 
and distinct concepts. This leads to Cronin’s criticism of the decision in 
R v W, where the court reintroduced a requirement that dishonesty be proved 
in any misconduct case that involved theft or fraud. In summary, 
notwithstanding Cronin’s critique, it may be noted that in R v W the Court 
found that: 
depending on the acts and omissions alleged, the mental element of the 
offence will vary … Accordingly the nature of the conduct falling within 
the ambit of the offence is very wide, and logically it would follow that any 
necessary element relating to the defendant’s subjective state of mind 
cannot be identical for each and every one of its different manifestations.65 
Thus, in some cases, the case law suggests that it will be insufficient — in 
order to establish the offence of misconduct in public office — to simply 
demonstrate that the relevant conduct or omission occurred and that the 
defendant acted intentionally. Evidence may be required of dishonesty or 
deceit, or, at least, a subjective awareness or appreciation of the consequences 
that would likely flow from the act or omission.  
4 Reasonable Excuse or Justification 
R v Dytham demonstrated the requirement of sufficient connection between 
wilfulness and lack of excuse of justification. The judge found that:  
The neglect must be wilful and not merely inadvertent; and it must be 
culpable in the sense that it is without reasonable excuse or justification … 
The allegation made was not of mere non-feasance but of deliberate failure 
and wilful neglect … This involves an element of culpability.66 
                                                 
64 Cronin, above n 57, 293. These words draw on a comment from AG Reference No 3 [2004] 
EWCA Crim 868 [28] that: ‘[W]ilful misconduct means “deliberately doing something which 
is wrong knowing it to be wrong or with reckless indifference as to whether it is wrong or 
not”. That statutory construction has been approved by the Court of Appeal and the House of 
Lords.’ However, it should be noted that the AG Reference No 3 ruling went on to say: ‘We 
regard that direction as helpful in present circumstances, considering as we do that the 
concept of wilful misconduct is apt to the offence of misconduct in public office.’  
65 [2010] EWCA Crim 372 [8]. 
66 (1979) 69 Cr App R 387, 394 (Shaw LJ, Widgery LCJ and McNeill J). 
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Together, the third and fourth elements of the offence relate to the 
determination of a public official’s culpability for the relevant act or omission. 
Beyond this, the requirement that the misconduct occur ‘without reasonable 
excuse or justification’ (element 4) may best be regarded as a defence, rather 
than an element of the offence per se.  
5 Seriousness of the Misconduct 
In R v Quach, the Victorian court was asked to consider the question of the 
seriousness of the misconduct. In arriving at the formulation of the fifth 
element of the offence, the court followed the approach adopted in Shum 
Kwok Sher and then Sin and Lam. The misconduct must be ‘serious having 
regard to the responsibilities of the office and the officeholder, the importance 
of the public objects which they serve and the nature and extent of the 
departure from those objects’.67  
Redlich JA, however, noted that although AG Reference No 3 ‘endorsed the 
condition that the “serious departure from proper standards … must be so far 
below acceptable standards as to amount to an abuse of the public’s trust in 
the office holder”, I do not regard this to be part of the definition of the 
offence although it serves to emphasise the degree of departure from the 
proper standard that must be established’.68 Thus, the formulation of 
‘seriousness’ in Quach does not require misconduct sufficient to constitute an 
abuse of office but requires non-trivial misconduct assessed within the context 
of the responsibilities of the public office holder and the departure from it.  
E Incidental Offences  
Parsons has identified multiple problems with those modern cases in England 
dealing with misconduct in public office. He argues that: conduct that does 
not involve actual misconduct in public office has been prosecuted where the 
conduct was merely incidental to the public office; the elements of the crime 
are uncertain; and specific alternative crimes can, and should, be prosecuted 
instead.69 Focusing on two English cases central to the revival of the offence 
(R v Llewellyn-Jones and R v Dytham), he argues that the facts of each of 
these cases show the breadth of crimes to which misconduct in public office 
may be applied. The former case involved a County Court registrar using his 
                                                 
67 R v Quach (2010) 27 VR 310 [43]. Redlich JA noted that both counsel for the accused and 
the Crown accepted that this formed part of the offence. 
68 Ibid [44]. 
69 Parsons, above n 14, 180. 
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office to gain an improper financial advantage (the registrar having used 
public moneys paid into a court to fund his private mortgage debt); the latter 
case involved an on-duty police officer who ignored a violent confrontation 
that resulted in the death of a victim of the attack. Parsons suggests that in 
each of these cases more specific charges (such as ‘fraud by abuse of position’ 
and ‘killing by gross negligence’ respectively) would have been more 
appropriate than misconduct in public office.70 Commenting on R v W, 
Parsons argues: 
this was not a case of misconduct in a public office as W’s misconduct did 
not take the form of a breach of, or failure to perform his duties, as a police 
officer. W should have been charged with theft or, if there had been a false 
representation, fraud.71  
Spencer72 has also offered a critique of the application of misconduct in 
public office to what he regards as incidental offences. Commenting on R v 
W, Spencer argues that misconduct in public office ‘should not cover what the 
detective did [in R v W], even if “dishonesty” was present’.73 He makes the 
point that the essence of the crime of misconduct in public office is either 
wilful neglect of entrusted public duties or wilful abuse of office for some 
improper end, arguing that the scope of the crime should have a restricted 
ambit such that it ought not to cover the incidental commission of another 
crime ‘as might be committed by any dishonest employee’. Spencer suggests, 
instead, that the status of police officer ‘might be thought to aggravate the 
sentence for the fraud offence’.74 In summary, Spencer believes that 
misconduct in public office offences should be limited to the improper 
exercise of the public function and should not extend to behaviour merely 
incidental to it such as the making of fraudulent expense claims. 
The problem with the analyses of both Spencer and Parsons is that they fail to 
fully address the breach of the public trust inherent in misconduct in public 
office offences. The positions of the two authors may be arguable in the case 
of theft or fraud that occurs in the context of an offence against a private 
corporation. In such circumstances, the crimes of theft, false representation or 
fraud may be regarded as adequately encapsulating the wrongdoing. On the 
other hand, in the public realm, where action is pursuant to a public mandate 
and reliant on, and in the name of, the public trust, an additional dimension of 
                                                 
70 Ibid 180. 
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72 J R Spencer, ‘Policemen Behaving Badly — The Abuse of Misconduct in Public Office’ 
(2010) 69(3) Cambridge Law Journal 423. 
73 Ibid 423. 
74 Ibid 423–4 (emphasis added). 
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the breach is arguably not captured by the ‘head’ offence. Specifically, police 
officers must be held to a high standard and where a public official, paid from 
the public purse, engages in behaviour within the very organisation that is 
tasked with investigating such crimes on behalf of the public, that public trust 
is itself breached and offended.  
There may be factual scenarios where it is merely incidental that the person is 
a police officer, and charging decisions in such cases should reflect this. 
However, as the subsequent discussion of recent cases demonstrates, the 
public interest is served in charging a police officer with the specific 
behaviour-relevant charge (for example, sexual assault or rape, trafficking in 
or possession of drugs, theft, bribery or extortion) and requiring the offender 
to face a charge that is directly related to the holding of public office and 
breach of behavioural expectations attached to that office. The offence of 
misconduct in public office arguably captures this element of the misconduct 
in a way that the more specific criminal charges do not. 
III BREACH OF TRUST: CONTEMPORARY CASES 
A Disclosure of Confidential Information 
Police officers are privy to sensitive, confidential information in relation to 
the investigation and prosecution of crime. Occasionally, a police officer may 
disclose such information to parties outside the police force, without 
authorisation. Disclosure may be motivated by personal gain75 or a desire to 
benefit criminal acquaintances.76 Such disclosures may give rise to many 
forms of liability,77 including prosecution for misconduct in public office.  
In the 2005 case of DPP v Marks,78 the misconduct in public office charge 
(one count) was coupled with drug use and possession charges (two counts) 
relating to the drug ecstasy. At trial the police officer pleaded guilty to all 
charges. Without imposing a conviction, the judge imposed a fine of $4000 on 
the misconduct in public office charge and $300 and $50 respectively in 
relation to the drug charges. The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) 
                                                 
75 See R v Casburn (Unreported, Southwark Crown Court, Fulford J, 1 February 2013) 
<http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Judgments/april-casburn-
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76 DPP v Marks [2005] VSCA 277. 
77 Interestingly, in DPP v Artz [2013] VCC 56, a police officer who disclosed confidential 
information to a journalist was prosecuted under s 127A(1AB) of the Police Regulations Act 
1958 (Vic) rather than for misconduct in public office (see below n 126). 
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appealed against the sentence. The key claim was that, in failing to record a 
conviction and imposing the specified fines, the judge had failed to give 
appropriate weight to relevant sentencing considerations and had placed too 
much weight on mitigating factors.79 The DPP focused on the seriousness of 
the offence, the need for general deterrence of other police officers and public 
officials, the breach of trust involved, and the damage to public confidence 
associated with the offence.80 
A key issue for the Court of Appeal, and an impediment to a successful appeal 
by the DPP, was the unchallenged failure of the judge to make findings that 
the police officer’s conduct was anything more than an error of judgment. The 
DPP’s appeal was against the original sentence imposed but not against the 
County Court findings, thus binding the Court of Appeal to the findings of the 
trial judge.81  
The relevant facts underpinning the misconduct charge, as reported in the 
Court of Appeal judgment, were that the police officer accessed a confidential 
police database and obtained information which he subsequently passed on to 
a drug trafficker (who was the subject of a major drug investigation), relating 
to a friend of the drug dealer who had been intercepted and arrested for 
possessing 300 ecstasy tablets. This information was accessed in response to 
the drug trafficker having requested it, and the information was conveyed over 
the phone by the police officer. The matter was identified as a result of a 
telephone intercept that was in place at the time. The disclosure of 
confidential information in the telephone conversation and the accessing of 
the confidential database formed the basis of the charges of misconduct in 
public office. 
In his defence, the police officer had said that he had known the drug 
trafficker for 10 years through his football club and, whilst the trafficker was 
‘not a really good mate’, the officer had given him the information ‘because 
he was a friend of mine and he was inquiring as to what … [had] happened to 
one of his friends’.82 The Crown accepted that the police officer believed the 
drug trafficker was only ‘low level’ and also accepted that police 
investigations had not been impeded by the police officer’s actions.83  
In summarising the initial sentencing judge’s reasoning, Eames J noted that 
the trial judge viewed the police officer’s behaviour as an error of judgment 
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81 Ibid [28] (Nettle J), [32] (Buchanan J). 
82 Ibid [10]. 
83 Ibid [12]. 
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rather than a display of moral turpitude, and that he had believed that the 
police officer acted because of his gregarious nature and the value placed by 
him on friendship and loyalty. Eames J believed that the trial judge relied on 
those characteristics to explain why the officer might have succumbed to what 
appeared to the officer to have been ‘a relatively innocent transfer of 
information’.84  
The Court of Appeal was highly critical of this reasoning, with Nettle J 
describing it as ‘fanciful’ to believe that ‘the provision of criminal intelligence 
to a known drug dealer’ could be regarded as a ‘relatively innocent transfer of 
information’.85 On the contrary, Nettle J stated that ‘it was a serious 
offence’.86  
Notwithstanding these remarks, the Court of Appeal was confined by the 
formal basis of the appeal. Although the finding of the original court was 
described as ‘remarkably generous’, with evidence described as ‘point[ing] 
very clearly to the opposite conclusion’, the Court was ‘bound by the finding 
made’ because an appeal must be ‘strictly confined by the terms of the Notice 
of Appeal’.87 Counsel for the DPP made it clear to the Court that the sentence 
was the DPP’s key concern.88 Despite this, Nettle J noted: 
Were it not for the way in which the matter was conducted before the 
sentencing judge and on this appeal, I have no doubt that the respondent 
should have been convicted of the offence of misconduct in public office, 
and that the seriousness of the offence would have warranted a term of 
imprisonment. … However it is not now open to rectify the position.89  
The appeal was dismissed, but the Court made a number of key points relating 
to the scope and relevance of the offence. Interestingly, Counsel for the DPP 
argued that the original trial judge seemed to believe that, by virtue of the 
police officer having to answer a prosecution in the County Court, this was 
sufficient punishment to amount to general deterrence. She pointed out that 
misconduct in public office is an indictable offence and the fact that the 
prosecution was brought in the County Court rather than the misconduct being 
made the subject of prosecution for unauthorised disclosure of information in 
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the Magistrates’ Court under section 127A of the Police Regulation Act 
reflected the seriousness of the offence but should not be regarded as 
punishment in itself.90 This point received strong support from Nettle J when 
he said:  
[T]here is throughout the learned sentencing judge’s remarks an idea that 
the respondent was somehow harshly dealt with by being charged with an 
indictable offence of misconduct in public office, rather than being dealt 
with summarily under the Police Regulation Act 1958. Rightly or wrongly, I 
gain the impression also that his Honour’s sentencing disposition may have 
been informed by some such notion. Such a notion would be 
misconceived.91  
Nettle J went on to clearly articulate the importance and utility of the offence 
of misconduct in public office both in general terms and in circumstances 
such as DPP v Marks: 
Unlike the narrower offences of bribery and extortion, the offence of 
misconduct in public office is not primarily concerned with abuse of 
position for pecuniary gain, but rather, as a common law offence, it gives 
expression to principles attributed to Lord Mansfield: that a man accepting 
an office of trust concerning the public is answerable criminally to the 
Crown for misbehaviour in the office; and that, whereas breach of trust, 
fraud and imposition in a matter concerning the public is as between 
individuals only actionable, between the Crown and the subject it is 
indictable. The object is to ensure that an official does not, by any wilful act 
or omission, act contrary to the duties of his office; does not abuse 
intentionally the trust reposed in him.92  
His Honour found that Marks had accepted an office of trust by virtue of his 
appointment as a constable and that he had abused that trust when he 
knowingly passed on information despite being aware of his duty to maintain 
the confidentiality of information held on the police database. The fact that 
the information passed on concerned the arrest of a man the police officer 
knew to be a drug trafficker resulted in an appropriate indictment for 
misconduct in public office.  
It should be noted that in Victoria the common law offence of misconduct in 
public office carries a maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment93 whereas 
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in the United Kingdom the sentence is at the discretion of the court (and 
theoretically can be anything up to life imprisonment).  
B Misrepresentation of Office  
In 2007 in DPP v Armstrong94 the Victorian DPP again appealed a sentence 
involving a police officer who had pleaded guilty to three counts of 
misconduct in public office, two counts of theft, and one count of trafficking 
in a drug of dependence. All counts arose out of separate transactions between 
the police officers, two cannabis growers and an unregistered informant of a 
junior colleague of Armstrong (Johnson). Armstrong was sentenced to various 
terms of imprisonment for the offences, ranging from one to 12 months’ 
imprisonment — all to be served concurrently.95 The net result was a total 
effective sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment, eight months of which was 
suspended for two years.96 
Armstrong had told the trial court that he had felt pressured to commit the 
offences by his co-offender (Johnson). According to the evidence, as reported 
in the Court of Appeal judgment, Armstrong knew that his colleague was in 
financial trouble and he suspected that Johnson wanted him to accompany 
Johnson to the home of a cannabis grower. Armstrong acknowledged that he 
was aware that the purpose of the visit was ‘to get information for [Johnson] 
and not for the job … he wanted to make money for himself, his financial 
gain’.97 Armstrong said that he accompanied Johnson out of an obligation to 
see that he was all right, but not to help him financially. 
The two police officers attended the home of the cannabis grower. Prior to the 
visit they had signed on at the police station (although they were not rostered 
for duty) and had signed out firearms and other equipment before going to the 
victim’s residence in an unmarked police car. On arrival at the house they 
identified themselves as police officers and Johnson purported to have a 
search warrant that he showed to the victim. Armstrong knew that no search 
warrant had been issued and that the victim had only very limited English. 
The guns of both police officers were visible.  
The first count of misconduct in public office was based on Armstrong 
unlawfully gaining entry to the premises of the victim by allowing Johnson to 
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state that he had a search warrant.98 The police officers searched the premises, 
found 18 cannabis plants and heat lamps that they removed into their own 
possession (this conduct leading to the first count of theft). 
Whilst in the house and in the presence of Armstrong, Johnson asked the 
victim if he had any money and indicated that if he paid he would have no 
further trouble. The victim said that he did not have money but that he would 
borrow some. After leaving the house, the two police officers then contacted 
their initial informant (who had provided the information about the victim) to 
ask where they could dry out the cannabis. They went to a property to which 
they were directed by the informant and placed the plants in a shed to dry out. 
Johnson and the victim discussed splitting the proceeds three ways (this 
conduct leading to a charge of trafficking in a drug of dependence).99 
Later that evening there were a number of telephone calls between the victim 
and Johnson as to whether the promised money had been obtained. A meeting 
was agreed upon. The victim and the two police officers arrived at the 
meeting in their respective cars. While Armstrong remained in his car, 
Johnson accepted the handover of $8000 in the other car. Although Armstrong 
had no contact with the victim on this occasion, he was aware of events and 
did not prevent the extortion. The second count of misconduct in public office 
related to this behaviour.100  
The next day Johnson told Armstrong that the cannabis crop was missing and 
that police had seized it. Both went to visit the victim to make sure that he had 
not spoken to other police. A few days later Armstrong made inquiries with 
the Asian squad regarding the discovery of a marijuana crop but he did not 
reveal that he knew anything about the matter. About a week later Johnson 
was interviewed by the Ethical Standards Department. He claimed that he had 
seen the cannabis and planned to make further inquiries and execute a search 
warrant. Armstrong provided a statement to the Ethical Standards Department 
that confirmed Johnson’s version of events.101 About a month later, 
Armstrong was arrested and initially ‘made a “no comment” record of 
interview’.102 However, in a subsequent interview he admitted the theft of 
cannabis, admitted taking it to the farm to dry it out, but denied any plan to 
split the money three ways with the victim and Johnson.  
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The final count of misconduct in public office related to a separate incident 
involving a similar modus operandi. Both police officers had again visited a 
property where cannabis was being grown and trafficked; again a document 
was presented which purported to be a search warrant and the police officers 
seized and removed 20 cannabis plants. The seizure of this crop was not 
recorded or entered in a police property log.103 The false representation 
regarding the search warrant resulted in the third count of misconduct in 
public office, and the seizure of the cannabis was the subject of a further theft 
charge.104 
At trial, the judge found that it was Johnson who had initiated the offences 
and that Armstrong had just gone along with him. He also found that 
Armstrong knew that ‘Johnson was a police officer who, at the very least, was 
prepared to cut corners, was high-handed, and was prepared to do things 
which could jeopardise successful prosecution’.105 The Court of Appeal noted 
that the initial trial judge took account of the seriousness of the offending 
when he said: 
Corruption in the police force can only flourish if decent officers turn a 
blind eye to it. Every corrupt or wayward member of the Victorian Police 
Force must understand that if they abuse their powers or cross over to the 
other side of the law the courts will see that they face the humiliating and 
degrading experience of sharing prison with common criminals, onerous as 
that may be for them.106  
The DPP appealed against the individual sentences, the head sentence, and the 
extent of the order for partial suspension, on the ground of manifest 
inadequacy. In particular, the gravity of the three counts of misconduct in 
public office and their importance to the concept of general deterrence were 
highlighted. The DPP argued that insufficient weight had been given to 
factors that aggravated Armstrong’s blameworthiness, including the fact that 
he held a senior rank to Johnson and that the offences involved serious 
breaches of trust. 
The Court of Appeal considered whether partial suspension of sentence was 
warranted in light of the circumstances of the case. The Court held that, whilst 
the trial judge had acknowledged the serious consequences of police 
misconduct, the sentences imposed in relation misconduct in public office: 
                                                 
103 Armstrong initially received a sentence of imprisonment for one month on this count. 
104 DPP v Armstrong [2007] VSCA 34 [14]. 
105 Ibid [16]. 
106 Ibid [17] (Neave JA, Vincent JA and Kellam AJA). 
116 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 19 NO 1 
do not adequately reflect the gravity of these offences ... The respondent 
was sentenced to only one month’s imprisonment on each of the counts 
involving illegal entry on to premises and to only one year’s imprisonment 
on the count covering the extortion of money from [the victim] in return for 
not reporting the presence of cannabis.107 
The Court noted that ‘police are in a position to exercise considerable power 
over others. The respondent’s behaviour seriously abused that power’.108 
After the misconduct came to light, Armstrong continued to lie to the Ethical 
Standards Department. On the issue of corruption the Court noted: 
Corruption in those responsible for enforcing the law has significant social 
consequences. … [I]t may undermine public confidence in the police force, 
erode the morale of honest police officers and encourage other police to turn 
a blind eye to similar behaviour. The community is entitled to rely on the 
integrity of members of the police force in investigating and prosecuting 
offenders.109  
The Court of Appeal went on to note that the temptation for police to extort 
money or abuse power is likely to be considerable when they are dealing with 
criminals because criminals are unlikely to report corruption through fear that 
this will reveal their own involvement in offending: 
For this reason corrupt practices in dealing with criminals may be even 
more insidious than the corruption which affects honest members of the 
community, who are more likely to report police attempts to extort money 
from them. Sentences imposed for such offences must reflect public 
denunciation of the behaviour of the offender and deter other police from 
committing similar offences. General deterrence must therefore be given 
significant weight in sentencing a member of the police force for offences 
involving corruption or extortion.110 
Whilst the court did take into account a number of mitigating factors raised at 
the initial trial, the judges nevertheless said that: 
the sentences imposed by his Honour in relation to the three counts of 
misconduct in public office did not adequately reflect the gravity of the 
offences and gave too much weight to mitigating factors. … If it were not 
for the limitations imposed by the need to take account of the double 
jeopardy principle, I would have been inclined to impose a much higher 
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sentence for count 4, which was the most serious of the counts involving 
misconduct in public office111 
In summary, the Court of Appeal increased the two separate one-month 
sentences to six months each. It imposed a sentence of two years’ 
imprisonment for the extortion related misconduct for which Armstrong had 
previously been given one year. These sentences, along with the sentences for 
the other offences which remained unchanged, were all to be served 
concurrently. This created a total effective sentence of two years with one 
year of the sentence suspended (for an operational period of two years).112  
This case demonstrated that the Court of Appeal considered the misconduct in 
public office charges as serious, constituting a separately identifiable aspect of 
the wrongdoing, and warranting separate attention by the Court.  
C Misconduct by Off-Duty Sexual Activity 
In R v Quach, previously discussed, the Court of Appeal was asked to 
consider the elements of misconduct in public office on a referral on a point of 
law. The Court provided a comprehensive analysis. The facts giving rise to 
the charge of misconduct in public office involved sexual activity by a police 
officer. Whilst the engagement of on-duty police officers in sexual activity 
had previously resulted in liability for misconduct in public office,113 what 
was unusual about Quach was that the sexual relationship had occurred while 
the officer was off duty. Consequently, a key aspect of the case was the 
establishment of a sufficient nexus between the ‘public office’ and the 
offence.  
As recounted in the Court of Appeal judgment, whilst on duty and in the 
company of other police officers, the defendant attended at the apartment of a 
young woman, to make a welfare check (as she had recently attempted 
suicide). Later that day, when off duty, he returned to the apartment with 
some groceries. The young woman was at home and she was aware that 
Quach was a police officer. The Crown alleged that, at his suggestion, they 
went back to his apartment, where she showered, changed her clothes and 
walked on his back to relieve back pain. The Crown further alleged that at this 
                                                 
111 Ibid [36]–[37]. 
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113 See, eg, ‘Diplomatic Protection Officer Jailed for Sex on Duty’, BBC News London (online), 
18 March 2013 < http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-21832148>; ‘Police Worker 
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point sexual activity occurred. (The defence denied this.) Later they returned 
to the young woman’s apartment.114  
The offence of misconduct in public office related to the allegation that Quach 
had wrongfully used his public office (or knowledge obtained in that office) to 
procure sexual penetration of a person suffering from bipolar disorder and 
known to him to be at risk of committing suicide, even though that conduct 
did not occur in the performance of his duty. The defence argued that he did 
not use his position or knowledge to take advantage of the person, that no 
sexual activity occurred and that he did not know of the state of the victim’s 
mental health. Alternatively, the defence argued that the sexual activity had 
not occurred whilst Quach was acting as a police officer and therefore an 
element of the offence could not be made out.115 
The findings of Redlich JA in Quach make clear that liability for misconduct 
in public office is not restricted to a police officer who is on duty; the 
requirement is that there must be ‘a sufficient connection to their public 
office’.116 This will very much turn on the individual facts of each case. The 
problematic conduct must also be ‘so far below acceptable standards as to 
amount to an abuse of the public’s trust in the office holder’ and ‘sufficient to 
attract criminal punishment’.117 In Quach, the Court found that both 
requirements were satisfied. 
IV DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
A number of police services in England and Australia have pursued the 
implications of the public standards discussion for their internal police ethics 
standards. This usually relates to expectations that police will exercise their 
powers and discretion to the highest standards of competence, fairness and 
honesty. On occasion, police do not meet these standards and the aberrant 
behaviour is deemed too serious for the internal discipline systems. In 
addition to specific criminal charges following misconduct, we are now 
witnessing the resurgence of the offence of misconduct in public office. 
The detailed case discussion above provides practical illustrations of the 
various manifestations of misuse of police power and authority. The cases 
illustrate the level of seriousness required for an offence to attract a criminal 
sanction beyond the summary level provided for by the legal regulatory 
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framework governing police (such as the Police Regulation Act 1958 (Vic)) or 
by other summary offences. They also illustrate the connection required 
between the public office and the misconduct for these breaches to constitute 
misconduct in public office. 
The CPS in England appears to favour strictly confining the offence, 
commenting in its guidelines that where there is clear evidence of one or more 
statutory offences, they should form the basis of the prosecution, with the 
element of ‘public office’ providing an aggravating factor to be considered in 
sentencing.118 In England, the guidelines support charging the accused with a 
specific statutory offence in preference to using the common law offence of 
misconduct in public office. English courts have endorsed this approach.119 In 
specific commentary and advice on charging practice, a United Kingdom 
Parliamentary Note comments that an assault by a police officer could 
arguably result in a misconduct in public office charge. However, an assault 
charge would also provide the court with the appropriate sentencing powers, 
with the misconduct by a public officer (the police officer) providing the 
aggravating factor to be considered in sentencing.120 Legal commentators in 
England have argued that the common law offence is too broad and that 
alternative statutory offence charges should be pursued in preference.121  
In Australia, the DPP in each jurisdiction has significant discretion in relation 
to charging decisions and the discretion to prosecute is not subject to judicial 
review.122 Although all state and territory DPPs have issued publicly available 
guidelines that govern the exercise of prosecutorial discretion generally, no 
guidelines have been published that indicate how the discretion is to be 
exercised in relation to prosecuting misconduct in public office. It is clear that 
significant misconduct by police is also being prosecuted under statutory 
provisions such as section 127A of the Police Regulation Act 1958 (Vic).123 
The publication of guidelines by prosecution authorities in Australia, similar 
to those developed by the CPS in England, would be helpful in establishing 
the circumstances in which the common law offence is likely to be 
prosecuted. In the meantime, the current review of selected cases provides 
some guidance as to the prosecution of misconduct in public office in 
Australia. 
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In the matter of DPP v Marks, the key misconduct related to the disclosure of 
confidential information from a confidential police database to a drug 
trafficker about an associate, both of whom were the subjects of ongoing 
investigation. The disinterested independence of police processes is central to 
the integrity of such processes. Both the fact and appearance of independence 
are central to the maintenance of public trust in policing. There are numerous 
situations where the private relationships and involvements of police officers 
can present an officer with a conflict of interest, undermine the impartiality of 
policing, and lead to a compromise in the administration of justice.124 In 
choosing to disclose information about a police case from a ‘secure’ database 
to a criminal who had an interest in the outcome of the police action, the 
police officer has breached the trust inherent in the office, this constituting 
misconduct in public office, against which the public has a right to be 
protected. It constitutes a breach of the public trust, because of the public 
interest in the nature of the information that was disclosed and its centrality to 
the effective functioning of the police force. The application of the 
misconduct in public office offence rather than of a lesser summary offence 
(for example, a prosecution under section 127A of the Police Regulation Act 
1958 (Vic)) provides potential future offenders with an indication of the 
seriousness of the breach.125 
The general principle that police officers should have the same freedom as 
ordinary citizens to engage in private pursuits and relationships, unhindered 
by regulation, is prima facie reasonable, on the basis that intrusion into 
anyone’s private life should be minimal. However, this general position can 
reasonably be qualified in circumstances where a police officer may use his or 
her position to prey on the vulnerable.126 In relation to sexual misconduct or 
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impropriety, police management can take any one or more of a number of 
disciplinary actions against officers. When an officer develops a close 
personal relationship with a person with whom he/she first came into contact 
during the course of police duties, allegations may be raised that the position 
of police officer was in fact used (abused) in order to facilitate and further 
such a relationship. This can amount to an abuse of trust — the trust both of 
the victim and the broader public. The matter of Quach illustrates a serious 
breach and confirms that liability for misconduct may occur in relation to 
matters arising when a public official is ‘off duty’. 
The case of Armstrong involved two key areas where the public trust was 
breached. First, when police officers abused their power and made false 
claims regarding the existence of search warrants, they knowingly breached 
multiple procedural safeguards developed to protect individual rights. Second, 
when police officers extorted money in exchange for a promise not to enforce 
the law, public trust and confidence in those officers was eroded and the flow-
on consequence for the organisation as a whole was a loss of trust. In an 
extreme form, this conduct can impact on the perceived legitimacy of 
policing. So, whilst the facts of this case supported separate charges against 
the police relating to possession of drugs and theft, there was also a need to 
charge them with an offence that captured the abuse of office and the breach 
of public trust inherent in behaviour that the court referred to as ‘corrupt 
conduct’. The Court of Appeal expressly noted the need to deter police from 
extorting money or abusing power, recognising that in scenarios where police 
are dealing with criminals, the latter are unlikely to report corruption through 
fear that this will reveal their own involvement in offending. 
In summary, the offence of misconduct in public office provides prosecuting 
authorities with an ability to charge a public official with an offence that 
reflects the fact that the circumstances of the offending amount to a non-trivial 
abuse of the public trust. The cases outlined above provide examples of the 
types of conduct and procedural breaches that courts in Australia, England 
and Hong Kong have found constituted misconduct in public office. The 
Australian jurisprudence exemplified in Quach seems to have more clearly 
articulated the key elements of the offence. Whilst Australia is yet to see the 
range of applications to public officials that has occurred in England,127 recent 
developments indicate that the offence may occur in numerous and varied 
employment scenarios, including privatised state services.  
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